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The process of transition is a 
much broader civic enterprise 
than that which positivist law 
can alone bring about.1
Constitutional amendments adopted in Croatia in 2010 that allowed re-
troactive prosecution of economic crimes related to the process of ownership tran-
sformation and privatization committed during the Homeland War and peaceful 
reintegration, and war profiteering cases (transitional economic crimes) opened a 
Pandora’s box. It should be argued that these Constitutional amendments and 
the Act on Exemption from the Statute of Limitations belong to the mechanisms of 
“transitional justice” usually implemented in post-conflict societies with the aim 
of achieving full realization of the rule of law and the principle of social justice. 
The one case prosecuted to date in Croatia on the basis of the Act on Exemption, 
received tremendous media attention: the case against the former prime minister 
of Croatia, Ivo Sanader. 
As the decision in the Sanader case has become final, this article illuminates 
the transitional justice narrative of the Act on Exemption and raises the questi-
*  Sunčana Roksandić Vidlička, M. Sc., Assistant, Faculty of Law, University of 
Zagreb, Trg maršala Tita 14, Zagreb
1 Hamilton, M., Freedom of Assembly, Consequential Harm and the Rule of Law: Liberty-
limiting Principles in the Context of Transition, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 17, 
no. 1, 2007, p. 81. 
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on whether this Act as such, through the Sanader case, could be put under the 
scrutiny of the European Court of Human Rights as a “transitional justice case” 
that tackles some of the most fundamental provisions of the European Convention 
of Human Rights. This article therefore explores the narratives of transitional ju-
stice discourse, and touches upon the need to protect economic, social and cultural 
rights in the context of transitional justice mechanisms. Moreover, this article tries 
to anticipate some of the questions with which the European Court of Human 
Rights could deal in order to either confirm or reject the Croatian approach towar-
ds combating transitional economic crimes. In any case, if this “Croatian model” 
of transitional justice laws is proven to be legally justified and effective, it could be 
implemented in the other countries in the region and possibly serve as a model on 
how to approach long neglected crimes – transitional economic offences that could 
have grave consequences on the development of the society.
Keywords: transitional justice discourse, the Sanader case, jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR in “transitional justice” cases, the Croatian Act on Exemption of 
Statute of Limitations, possible reasoning of the ECtHR regarding the Act on 
Exemption 
1. INTRODUCTION2
Constitutional amendments adopted in Croatia in 20103 allowed retroac-
tive prosecution of transitional economic crimes and war profiteering cases.4 
The experience of war and peaceful reintegration combined with a transition 
2 This article is written in the honour of professor emeritus Željko Horvatić. The topic 
of article was chosen taking into consideration the academic interest and scholarship 
of prof. emer. Željko Horvatić, e.g. Horvatić, Ž., Djelovanje međunarodnih organizacija u 
suzbijanju kriminala, Zagreb, Pravni fakultet u Zagrebu, 2002; Horvatić, Ž., Globalno 
suprotstavljanje kriminalu na prijelomu milenija, Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu, 
vol. 51, no. 2, 2001, pp. 249 – 305; Horvatić, Ž., Ostvarenje i zaštita vladavine prava 
u hrvatskom kaznenom pravu, Zbornik Pravnog Fakulteta u Zagrebu, vol. 51, no. 6, 
2001, pp. 1195 – 1223. It also belongs in part to the doctoral research project 
conducted by the author at the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International 
Criminal Law. See more in Roksandić Vidlička, S., Severe Economic Crimes Committed 
in Transitional Periods – Crimes under International Criminal Law?, in: Albrecht, H.-J., 
Getoš Kalac, A.-M., Kilchling, M. (eds.), Mapping the Criminological Landscape of the 
Balkans, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, (forthcoming 2014).
3 The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, Official Gazette, No. 76/10, 85/10.
4 See more in Novoselec, P., Roksandić Vidlička, S., Maršavelski, A., Retroactive 
prosecution of transitional economic crimes in Croatia – testing the legal principles and human 
rights, in: van Erp, J., Huisman, W., Vande Walle, G. (eds.), The Routledge Handbook 
of White-Collar and Corporate Crime in Europe, Abingdon, Routledge, (forthcoming 
2015). 
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from one economic system to another also determined two categories of tran-
sitional economic crimes in Croatia for which the statute of limitations is now 
abandoned: (1) war profiteering crimes, and (2) crimes in the process of privatization 
and ownership transformation.5 It is considered that the perpetrators of these 
transitional economic crimes abused the vulnerability of both processes.
The Proposal of the Decision to Amend the Constitution of Croatia6 to allow ret-
roactive prosecution of transitional economic offences specified that ownership 
transformation and privatization did not produce the expected economic out-
comes and had no significant positive impact on the economic development of 
Croatia: “On the contrary, the implementation of transformation and privatiza-
tion resulted in an increase of domestic and foreign debt, caused a significant 
increase in unemployment, disproportionate and fast enrichment of individuals, 
and unjust impoverishment of many… It is just and in the spirit of interna-
tional law to deny the perpetrators of such grave crimes the possibility to avoid 
criminal liability by the application of the statute of limitations. The basis for 
the statute of limitations is the guarantee of legal certainty to citizens, but it is 
certain that this institute should not be to the benefit of the perpetrators en-
abling them to practically legalize the effects of such acts through the statute of 
limitations.”7 After the Constitutional amendment, in 2011 the Act on Exemp-
tion from the Statute of Limitations for War Profiteering and Crimes Commit-
ted in the Process of Ownership Transformation and Privatization8 (hereinafter: 
the Act on Exemption) was passed as was a new Criminal Code.9 
Therefore, one could point out that the Act on Exemption belongs to the 
transitional justice mechanisms necessary to be implemented in a particular 
society in order to reach “transition” to the democracy and the rule of law. 
Hence, the question that imposes itself here is whether the country in ques-
tion follows or breaches the principle of legality and the rule of law by making 
transitional policies and, therefore, whether it breaks or creates (new) circles 
of injustice.
5 Both categories of crimes are referred to later in this article as transitional economic 
crimes. 
6 See the explanation attached to the Croatian Government Proposal of the Decision to 
amend the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, from September 2009, available at: 
www.pravo.hr/_download/repository/prijedlog_izmjena_Ustava_2009.pdf (last 
visited 11.11.2014). See also Official Gazette, No. 89/2010. 
7 Ibid., p. 8.
8 Official Gazette, No. 57/11.
9 Official Gazette, No. 125/11, 144/12.
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One case prosecuted so far in Croatia on the basis of the Act on Exemption, 
received tremendous media attention: the case against the former prime min-
ister of Croatia Ivo Sanader. At the end of the process, Sanader was sentenced 
to 8.5 years imprisonment.10 
As the Sanader case has become final, this article explores the transitional 
justice narrative of the Act on Exemption and the question whether this Act, 
as such, through the Sanader case, could be put under the scrutiny of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights (hereinafter: ECtHR) as one of its “transitional 
justice cases” that tackle some of the most fundamental provisions of the Eu-
ropean Convention of Human Rights (hereinafter: the Convention). In order 
to analyze possible breaches, a short overview of the Sanader case and the nar-
rative of transitional justice will be presented, as will as some approaches that 
ECtHR uses when putting under scrutiny “transitional” cases. 
2. THE SANADER CASE: AN OVERVIEW11
In August 2011, the prosecution indicted former Croatian Prime Minister 
Ivo Sanader for bribery. While negotiating the terms of a loan to be granted by 
the Austrian bank Hypo-Alpe-Adria International AG to the Government of 
the Republic of Croatia, in the capacity of Deputy Minister of foreign affairs, 
Sanader made a deal to be paid a commission in cash in the amount of seven 
million Austrian schillings in return for that bank’s entry into the Croatian 
market, which the bank indeed paid in the course of 1995. The crime was 
classified as a war profiteering crime and abuse of office and authority.12 In 
addition to these charges, in September 2011, the prosecution charged13 Sa-
nader with receiving a €10 million bribe while serving as the Prime Minister of 
Croatia, from Zsolt Hernadi, chairman of the management board of the Hun-
garian oil company MOL for transferring the controlling rights in the Croatian 
oil company INA to MOL. 
As the judges pointed out in the first instance judgment against Sanader14, 
as the former Prime Minister of the country, he abused his position for its 
10 Croatian Supreme Court Judgment 2014. Case I Kž-Us 94/13-10.
11 For details of the case see Roksandić Vidlička S., Recent Changes in the Regulation of 
the Statute of Limitations in Croatia for Transitional Economic Crimes, Justice Actualités 
Report, vol. 29, no. 2, 2014, pp. 25 – 27. 
12 Indictment No. K-US-48/11, IS-US-6/11, August 31, 2011.
13 For details visit the official prosecutor’s web page: http://www.dorh.hr/
PodignutaOptuznicaProtivIveSanadera01 (last visited: 11.11. 2014.). 
14 Zagreb County Court Judgment 2012. Case K-Us-26/11. 
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own enrichment and not for the common good. According to the first instan-
ce judges, “this judgment sends a message to people in power, current and 
future, that holding a public office must be performed for the common good 
and in the interest of the society!” Furthermore, according to the judgment. 
Sanader’s behavior “contributed to the apathy and disillusionment of people 
in the system, created a belief among young people that honest labor does 
not pay, but the violation of the law and social morality does.” This judgment 
reiterates the point of the Venice Commission Report on the relationship between 
political and criminal ministerial responsibility: “An area of criminal law that may 
be of particular relevance for ministers is that of corruption, embezzlement 
and other forms of economic crime. It is of particular importance that such 
rules be strictly and effectively enforced against ministers and other publically 
appointed officials, since such offences are not only to be seen as criminal, but 
may also easily undermine public trust and the legitimacy and authority of the 
democratic system.”15 
Moreover, the second instance judgment in the Sanader case made one im-
portant step in order to clarify provision of the Act on Exemption. The Supre-
me Court16 defined what conduct should be considered as “war profiteering” 
especially relating to the conduct of public officials:17 
“Although war involves armed conflict, it is, however, not just about con-
flict. The war is a broader and more complex phenomenon because it involves 
other forms of struggle (political, economic, information), which have great 
importance for the preparation and conduct of war. Having this in mind, a 
notorious fact is that preparation of war and other forms of struggle that do 
not involve the use of weapons are carried out in an area that is not directly 
affected by the war… The fact that the war should be won on a political level, 
on which Croatia should prove its integrity, maturity, democracy and reliabi-
lity, creates the context in which criminalized behavior has the characteristics 
of war profiteering. Specifically, in this atmosphere the defendant used his 
official powers for illicit purposes, as it is rightly concluded by the trial court. 
…The defendant was entrusted with particular tasks, which at that time were 
extremely important for Croatia, and he abused that fact… by putting his 
personal interests above the interests of Croatian citizens. In this way, the 
15 European Commission on Democracy Through Law [Venice Commission] (2013): 
Report on the relationship between political and criminal ministerial responsibility. 
94th Plenary Session. Study No. 682/2012. CDL-AD(2013)001, para. 97.
16 The Supreme Court Judgment and Decision 2014, op. cit. in fn. 11, pp. 6 – 7. 
17 Ibid. 
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defendant… degraded the sacrifice of soldiers in the war and endangered the 
core values of the society. The proper conclusion of the trial court is that [by 
doing so] the defendant violated the public order. In view of this fact, it was ju-
stifiably established by the trial court that war profiteering does not only refer 
to previously known forms and phenomena such as raising the price of goods 
due to shortages, selling weapons to defend a country at disproportionately 
high prices, but also the behavior of which the defendant is found guilty….”
As it could be seen from this excerpt from the judgment, the Croatian Su-
preme Court gave a very extensive interpretation of the term war profiteering. 
An analysis of this discourse would extend beyond the scope of this article, but 
is a worthy endeavor to be undertaken in the future.
Hence, one should be aware that the charges against Sanader involving 
INA cannot be addressed as “privatization and ownership transformation pro-
fiteering” for which there is no statute of limitation as this privatization cycle 
for INA did not occur during: (1) the ‘Homeland War’, (2) peaceful reinte-
gration, (3) warfare, or (4) a direct threat to the independence and territorial 
integrity of the State. It is only in those situations that the Act on Exemption 
can be applied. The period in question, therefore, belongs to the Croatian 
“transitional period”. 
3. THE TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE DISCOURSE 
In order to get to the reasons why the Croatian Act on Exemption should be 
considered as part of the transitional justice mechanism applied in Croatia, 
one should first look at the narratives of the transitional justice discourse itself. 
Transitional justice refers to the set of judicial and non-judicial measures 
that have been implemented by different countries in order to redress the 
legacies of massive human rights abuses. These measures include criminal 
prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations programs, and various kinds of 
institutional reforms.18 Furthermore, for specific clarifications of the notion 
one should turn to one of the most cited definitions of transitional justice, 
given by Ruti Teitel. Teitel defines transitional justice as “the conception of 
justice associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal re-
sponses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes.”19 Te-
18 What is transitional justice? Factsheet, International Center for Transitional Justice, 
2009, http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Global-Transitional-Justice-2009-En-
glish.pdf (last visited 11.11.2014).
19 Teitel, R. G., Transitional Justice Genealogy, Harvard Human Rights Journal, vol. 16, 
2003, p. 69.
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itel further defines three phases of modern transitional justice. The first phase 
(Phase I) goes back to World War II20, as well as to post-World War I period, 
and was “extraordinary in its internationalism”. As Brems illuminates, the 
creation of “supranational human rights protection mechanisms after Second 
World War in itself can be considered as a transitional justice effort”21, with 
the Convention as one of the most successful examples of implementation 
of transitional justice mechanisms. Phase II, the post-Cold War phase, was 
associated with the post-1989 “wave of democratization, modernization and 
nation-building”22 mainly in response to the political changes in Latin America 
and Eastern Europe. Lastly, Phase III, according to Teitel, is associated with 
contemporary conditions of persistent conflict which lay the basis for the gen-
eralization and normalization of a law of violence.23 Hence, the narratives of 
global transitional justice, furthermore, “impl[y] an expanded legalism, while 
at the same time reflecting its trends of juridicization and decentralization in 
terms of jurisdictional sites – local and transnational – as well as new legiti-
macies based on a paradigm shift from state to human-centered discourse in 
foreign affairs.”24 Therefore, one could state that the development of inter-
national human rights law has an impact on the development of transitional 
justice mechanisms and vice versa. 
Moreover, broadly speaking, one could articulate that transitional justice 
relates to a set of legal, political and moral dilemmas about how to deal with 
past violence in societies undergoing some form of political transition.25 Influ-
ential articles by Guillermo O’Donnell and Samuel Huntington, canonized in 
Neil Kritz’s salient three-volume encyclopedia of transitional justice, viewed 
the parameters of justice in times of transition to democracy as a function of 
20 See also Winter, J., Cassin, R., State Sovereignity and Transitional Justice in the period of 
the Second World War, in: Brants, C., Hol, A., Siegel, D. (eds.), Transitional Justice, 
Images and Memories, Farnham, Ashgate, 2013, pp. 51 – 70.
21 Brems, E., Transtitional Justice in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights, 
The International Journal of Transitional Justice, vol. 5, 2011, pp. 282 – 303. 
22 Teitel, R., The Law and Politics of Contemporary Transitional Justice, Cornell 
International Law Journal, vol. 38, 2005, pp. 837 – 862, p. 839.
23 Teitel, op. cit. in fn. 19, p. 71.
24 Teitel, op. cit. in fn. 22, p. 841.
25 Sharp, D. N., Introduction: Addressing Economic Violence in Times of Transition, in: 
Sharp, D. N. (ed.), Justice and Economic Violence in Transition, New York, Springer 
Science+Business Media, 2014, pp. 1 – 26, p. 6, citing Nagy, R., Transitional Justice 
as Global Project: Critical Reflections, Third World Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 2, 2008, pp. 
275 – 289.
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a series of bargains between elite groups, with more or less justice available 
depending on the extent to which elite perpetrator groups were able to dictate 
the terms of transition.26 In any case, as Kemp illuminated27, the origins of 
transitional justice within the political science field meant that it was born 
with an explicitly political prism through which it examined law and particu-
larly human rights remedies. That reasoning also has implications for ECtHR’s 
point of view on transitional justice policies and respect of human rights in 
particular cases, as will be presented further in this article. 
In the UN Report on the “Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and 
Post-Conflict Societies”28 the notion of transitional justice “comprises the full range 
of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with 
a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and 
achieve reconciliation”. Justice, according to the Report, is viewed as “an ideal of 
accountability and fairness in the protection and vindication of rights and the preven-
tion and punishment of wrongs. Justice implies regard for the rights of the accused, for 
the interest of victims and for the well-being of society at large.”29 Transitional justice 
measures are considered as ones brought to “comprise the full range of pro-
cesses and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms 
with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve 
justice and achieve reconciliation.”30
In any case, in order to grasp what is embraced with the transitional justice 
discourse, one must bear in mind the following: the approach toward (re)build-
ing the transitional and post-conflict societies based solely on the improve-
ment of civil and political rights was proven to be counterproductive.31 As 
26 Sharp, ibid. See Huntington, S. P., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 
Twentieth Century, in: Kritz, N. (ed.), Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies 
Reckon with Former Regimes, Vol. 1, General Considerations, Washington, United 
States Institute of Peace, 1995, pp. 65 – 81, and O’Donnell, G., Schmitter, P., 
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule:Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies, 
in: Kritz, N. (ed.), ibid., pp. 57 – 64.
27 Kemp, S., Alternative Justice Mechanisms, Compliance and Fragmentation of international 
Law, in: Van Den Herik, L., Stahn, C. (eds.), The Diversification and Fragmentation 
of International Criminal Law, Leiden Studies on the Frontiers of International Law, 
Vol. 1, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012, p. 253.
28 UN Secretary General; The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-
Conflict Societies, U.N. Doc S/2004/616 (August, 23, 2004), para. 9.
29 Ibid, para. 7. 
30 UN Secretary General, op. cit. in fn. 28, para. 8. 
31 Carranza, R., Plunder and Pain: Should Transitional Justice Engage with Corruption and 
Economic Crimes?, International Journal of Transitional Justice, vol. 2, no. 3, 2008, 
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Schmid also pointed out, the constantly expanding literature on international 
criminal law and continuing efforts to redress the legacies of massive human 
rights abuses more broadly (sometimes referred to as transitional justice, post-
conflict justice or “dealing with the past”) have remained detached from the 
human rights literature on economic, social and cultural rights.32 But lately33 
it is argued more and more often within relevant institutions, such as the UN, 
and among scholars, that neglecting to prosecute transitional economic crimes 
only enhances the impunity gap and social conflict by focusing almost exclu-
sively on civil and political human rights violations, while leaving account-
ability for economic crimes behind: “literature, institutions and international 
enterprises of transitional justice historically have failed to recognize the full 
importance of structural violence, inequality and economic (re)distribution to 
conflict, its resolution, transition itself and processes of truth or justice-seeking 
and reconciliation.”34 One must add that other scholars have also criticized 
international law’s failure to address structural issues, “serenely treating the 
everyday divisions of wealth and poverty, the background norms for trade in 
arms and military conflicts as part of global donnée”.35 As Carranza36 argues, 
while transitional justice promotes accountability by what it chooses to con-
p. 329. For newest transitional justice discourse and violations of economic, social 
and cultural rights see United Nations, United Nations Human Rights Office of 
the High Commissioner, Transitional Justice and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
United Nations Publication 2014, and Schmid, E., Nolan, A., ‘Do No Harm’? 
Exploring the Scope of Economic and Social Rights in Transitional Justice, International 
Journal of Transitional Justice, vol. 8, no. 3, 2014, pp. 362 – 382.
32 Schmid, E., Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International and 
Transnational Criminal Law, Graduate institute of International and Development 
Studies Geneva – Doctoral Thesis No. 960, 2012, p. 6. 
33 It must also be noted that the number of international instruments for the protection 
of economic and social rights has significantly increased in the last few decades. 
Also, after May 2013 an individual complaint mechanism for protecting those 
rights is available as well (Optional Protocol to ICESCR). 
34 Miller, Z., Effects on Indivisibity: In Search of the ‘Economic’ in Transitional Justice, 
International Journal of Transitional Justice, vol. 2, no. 3, 2008, p. 266; see also 
Parmientier, S., Weitekamp, E., Political crimes and serious violations of human rights, 
in: Parmentier, S., Weitekamp, E., Deflem, M. (eds.), Crime and Human Rights, 
Bingley, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2007, pp. 110 – 111.
35 Starr, S., Extraordinary Crimes at Ordinary Times: International Justice Beyond Crisis 
Situations, Northwestern University Law Review, vol. 101, no. 3, 2007, p. 1261. 
Furthermore see Pogge, T., World Poverty and Human Rights. Ethics & International 
Affaires, vol. 19, no. 1, 2005, pp. 1 – 7.
36 Carranza, op. cit. in fn. 31, p. 310.
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front, it may reinforce impunity by what it chooses to ignore. Therefore, the 
strengthening of the protection of economic and social rights in transitional 
states, which also includes adequately regulating economic crimes, could be 
considered a condicio sine qua non, especially in states that shifted from the so-
cialist economic system to free market economy or are in one of the phases of 
the transitional period.37 
As transitional justice has the ambition to assist “the transformation of op-
pressed societies into free ones by addressing the injustices of the past through 
measures that will procure an equitable future”38, it calls for, as Alexander 
Boraine pointed out, a “holistic interpretation”. The holistic approach to tran-
sitional justice should include the protection and strengthening of all rights in 
order to avoid new injustices. In any case, the harms caused by such economic 
crimes to individuals and society can be seen as just as serious as those caused 
by other crimes.39 
To conclude, there are many phases and shapes of transition. Each country 
has its particularities. The Croatian particularity is that the process of priva-
tization occurred almost simultaneously with the Homeland war. Therefore, 
addressing crimes committed in the privatization process was not articulated 
as a priority for the Croatian society until rather recently. If the Sanader case 
appears before the ECtHR, the Court should bear in mind the above, and 
address the Act on Exemption as a transitional justice measure and treat the 
Sanader case as a “transitional justice” case. 
4. TRANSITIONAL CASES BEFORE THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HU-
MAN RIGHTS: GENERAL REMARKS AND GUIDING NARRATI-
VES OF THE ECtHR
According to the Preamble of the Convention, the protection of fundamen-
tal freedoms expressed in the UN Universal Declaration40 as the foundation of 
justice and peace, is best maintained by an effective political democracy and 
by a common understanding and observance of the human rights upon which 
they depend. Hence, the role of regional human rights mechanism, such as the 
37 Teitel, op. cit. in fn. 22, p. 69.
38 Arbour, L., Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Transition, Journal of International 
Law and Politics, vol. 40, no. 1, 2007, p. 2.
39 Carranza, op. cit. in fn. 39.
40 See particularly Arts. 22-27, in which economic, social and cultural rights are 
enshrined. UN(1948): General Assembly Resolution 217A (III), Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights., UN Document no. A/810.
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ECtHR, which “observes human rights”, is particularly relevant for the preserva-
tion of the needed balance between different human rights and freedoms and to 
imposing limitations to the states in addressing those rights, especially in tran-
sitional periods. As Hamilton and Buyse point out, “it is precisely in historical 
cases that the traditional justifications for deferring to the national courts are 
less persuasive”41 and the role of a regional court could be indispensable. 
In any case, human rights treaties are not forced upon states but entered 
into voluntarily “with a view to limiting the free display of forces and es-
tablishing obligations to take certain measures for the protection of human 
rights”.42 Therefore, Sweeney goes so far as to suggest that the ECtHR should 
become in transitional justice cases an “embodiment of an international form 
of transitional justice: the human rights counterpart to international criminal 
responses”.43 As pointed out by Sweeney, “by joining the Council of Europe, 
and signing and ratifying the ECtHR, it may be that states have thereby dis-
barred themselves from employing some transitional policies, in favor of a hu-
man rights based approach to transition.”44
In 1990s, and after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Council of Europe, as 
the ECtHR itself, had to deal with a wave of “transitional justice” cases arising 
mainly from Eastern European states that had undergone an economic sys-
tem shift, while some of them were going through war at the same time. The 
Council of Europe directly tackled transitional justice narratives, due also to 
the large number of potential cases, in its Resolution 1096 (1996) on Measures 
to dismantle the heritage of former communist totalitarian systems, which was also 
reiterated a decade later in Resolution 1481 (2006) on the Need for interna-
41 Hamilton, M., Buyse, A., Introduction, in: Hamilton, M., Buyse, A. (eds.), Transitional 
Jurisprudence and the ECHR: Justice, Politics and Rights, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2011, p. 18, citing Bárd, K., The Difficulties of Writing the Past 
through Law – Historical Trials Revisited at The European Court of Human Rights, 
International Review of Penal Law, vol. 81, 2010, p. 34.
42 Koch, I. E., Human Rights as Indivisible Rights: The Protection of Socio-Economic Demands 
under the European Convention on Human Rights, Leiden, Boston, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2009, p. 271. 
43 Sweeney, J. A., The European Court Of Human Rights in Post-Cold War Era, Abingdon, 
Routledge, 2013, p. 244. 
44 See particulary the ECtHR case Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 22 
December 2009 (Appl. Nos 27996/06 and 34836/06). See more about the case in 
Sweeny, J. A., Freedom of religion and democratic transition, in: Hamilton, Buyse (eds), 
op. cit. in fn. 41, pp. 103 – 130. 
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tional condemnation of crimes of totalitarian communist regime.45 In Resolution 1096 
it was stated that the key to peaceful coexistence and a successful transition 
process lies in striking the delicate balance of providing justice without seeking 
revenge, that the criminal acts committed by individuals during the commu-
nist totalitarian regime should be prosecuted and punished under the standard 
criminal code46, and that unlawfully expropriated property should be resti-
tuted (or compensation should be provided).47 Moreover, the Resolution also 
articulated that a democratic state must, instead of seeking revenge, respect 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as the right to due process and 
the right to be heard, and it must apply them even to people who, when they 
were in power, did not apply them themselves. These Resolutions were to 
serve as guiding narratives to newly accepted member states of the Council of 
Europe in passing “transitional” legislation. 
As is often underlined, in its scrutiny of transitional justice cases the ECtHR 
focuses on the responsibility of the main institutional transitional factor - the 
state and its various branches - in exploring to what extent the legal boundaries 
were transgressed in implementing transitional justice measures. Teitel empha-
sized that one of the key questions is whether (and if so, how) the “evolutive 
jurisprudence” of regional mechanisms can remain true to the rule of law while 
also meaningfully recognizing the acute social, economic and political exigen-
cies which characterize periods of transition.48 Furthermore, according to Teitel, 
in regional case law and in transitional jurisprudence, the conception of law is 
partial, contextual and situated between at least two legal and political orders. 
Legal norms are necessarily multiple, the idea of justice always a compromise. 
Therefore, the task of the ECtHR in transitional justice cases could be very com-
plex as a particularly delicate balance needs to be achieved. 
However, some authors have expressed different opinions. Posner and Ver-
meule doubt that transition is really a distinctive topic presenting a distinctive 
45 Council of Europe (2006): Resolution 1481 on the Need for international condemnation 
of crimes of totalitarian communist regime.
46 See the full application of that narrative in the case ECtHR, Streletz, Kessler and 
Krenz v Germany, 22 March 2001 (Appl. Nos. 34044/96, 35532/97 and 44801/98).
47 But see the decision of the ECtHR in Jahn v Germany, 30 June 2005 (Appl. 
Nos. 46720/99, 72203/01 and 72552/01): German reunification constituted an 
exceptional circumstance justifying the lack of compensation in case of expropriation. 
48 For instance see, Ždanoka v. Latvia, 16 March 2006 (Appl. No. 58278/00) and 
Kononov v. Latvia, 17 May 2010 (Appl. No. 36376/04), Strelez, Kessler and Krenz v. 
Germany, op. cit. in fn. 46.
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set of moral and jurisprudential dilemmas49, suggesting instead that that the 
problems are at most overblown versions of ordinary legal problems.50 On the 
other hand, “the line between transitional and non-transitional settings is eva-
nescent… indeed the invocation of arguments from transition may even serve 
courts well by providing a constitutive fiction which enables seeming fidelity 
to rule of law ideals whilst deferring to transitional pressure.”51
In any case, one could state that the processes of transition are not only 
about political or economic change. “They touch the core of societies’ identi-
ties” and “open discussion with a plurality of voices [what] is [deemed] neces-
sary but without losing crucial social cohesion.”52 For instance, many countries 
– particularly in Central and Eastern Europe – experienced economic liberal-
ization alongside political democratization. And in this regard, the ECtHR has 
recognized that transition from centrally planned to market oriented econo-
mies is “fraught with difficulties”.53 
Furthermore, one could claim that one of the most important standpoints 
of ECtHR in transitional justice cases for developing democracies was the EC-
tHR’s reasoning that democracy does not simply mean that the views of the 
majority must always prevail: a balance must be achieved which ensures the 
fair and proper treatment of minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant po-
sition.54 Therefore, it could also be stated that the role of the ECtHR is “simply 
to hold the new Council member states to their human rights commitments”.55 
While acknowledging the economic and political hurdles faced by transitional 
states, the ECtHR argued that “these difficulties and the enormity of the tasks 
49 See Posner, E., Vermeule A., Transitional justice as ordinary justice, Harvard Law 
Review, Vol. 117, 2003/2004, pp. 762 – 825.
50 Ibid., p. 765.
51 Hamilton, Buyse (eds.), op. cit. in fn. 41, p. 8 (citing Priban, J., Dissidents of Law: On 
the 1989 Velvet Revolutions, Legitimations, Fictions of Legality and Contemporary Version 
of the Social Contract, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2002, pp. 4 – 5).
52 Buyse, A., The truth, the past and the present: Article 10 ECHR and situations of 
transitions, in: Hamilton, Buyse (eds.), op. cit. in fn. 41, pp. 131 – 150. See also 
Kenedi v. Hungary, 26 May 2009 (Appl. No. 31475/05), Orban and others v. France, 
15 January 2009 (Appl. No. 20985/05). 
53 Schirmer v. Poland, 21 September 2004 (Appl. No. 68880/01), para. 38. Cited in 
Hamilton and Buyse in Hamilton, Buyse, op. cit. fn. 41, p. 12. 
54 Sørensen and Rasmussen v. Denmark, 11 January 2006 (Appl. Nos. 52562/99 and 
52620/99), para. 58, with reference to previous case law. Emphasized also in 
Palmer, E., Judicial review, socio-economic rights and the Human Rights Act, Oxford and 
Portland, Hart Publishing, 2007, p. 271, fn. 36.
55 Hamilton, Buyse, op. cit. in fn. 41, p. 16.
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facing legislators having to deal with all the complex issues involved in such 
transition do not exempt the Member States from the obligations stemming 
from the Convention or its Protocols.”56 Examination of equality in transi-
tion cases emphasized that while transitional priorities can relegate enduring 
inequalities to the political backburner, substantive (rather than procedural) 
equality is needed to challenge previously accepted distinctions and deepen 
commitment to democratic values.57 
Central principles which recur in judicial review of transitional justice cases 
by the ECtHR, namely the margin of appreciation (a principle of judicial defer-
ence) and proportionality (implicating a closer look at means-end analysis) and 
how they are used in transitional jurisprudence, were put under scrutiny by An-
toine Buyse, Michael Hamilton et al. in 2011.58 One could conclude from their 
research that balancing of principles and finding the “yardstick” is one of the 
most difficult tasks of the ECtHR, especially when applied to transitional cases. 
ECtHR case law related to transitional justice has included “hundreds of 
judgments…dealing with… mainly compensation and restitution, but also 
prosecution, lustration, memory and truth.”59 In its “transitional justice” ju-
risprudence, the ECtHR has pointed out that the mere context of transition 
is not sufficient as such to justify the need to interfere with human rights60, 
but on the other hand, that transitional relativism also has an impact on the 
universality of human rights. In any case61, the ECtHR has recognized that 
the states have a margin of appreciation.62 That margin though was not given 
56 Ibid. 
57 More about discrimination cases see in Smith, A., O’Connel, R., Transition, equality 
and non-discrimination, in: Hamilton, Buyse (eds.), op. cit. in fn. 41, pp. 185 – 208.
58 Hamilton, Buyse, op. cit. in fn. 41. To note, the new edition of the book was 
published in 2013. 
59 Brems, E., Transtitional Justice in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights, 
The International Journal of Transitional Justice, vol. 5, 2011, pp. 282 – 303, p. 282. 
60 See e.g. Partidul Comunistilor (Nepeceristi) and Ungureanu v. Romania, 3. February 
2005. Application no. 46626/99.
61 Varju, M., Transition as a Concept of European Human Rights Law, European Human 
Rights law Review, no. 2, 2009, pp. 170 – 189, p. 180. See, inter alia, Tryer v. UK, 
judgment of 15 April 1987, Series A no. 26, para. 36; Cossey v. UK, judgment of 27 
September 1990, Series A, no. 184, para. 35; Goodwin v. UK judgment of 11 July 
2002, ECHR 2002-IV para. 75. I v. UK, judgment of 11 July 2002, ECHR 2002-
VI, para. 75, Vo v. France, judgment of 8 July 2004, ECHR 2004-VIII; para. 82.
62 For exceptions concerning the margin of appreciation see e.g. Schabas, W., Synergy or 
Fragmentation? International Criminal Law and the European Convention of Human Rights, 
Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 9, 2011, pp. 609 – 632, p. 622.
Zbornik PFZ, 64, (5-6) 1091-1119 (2014) 1105
in Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina63 where the ECtHR held that a con-
stitutional arrangement excluding Roma and Jewish individuals from standing 
for election to parliament or the presidency in Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
discriminatory. Yet, as Brems points out64, and what clearly shows the com-
plexity of “transitional justice” cases, this “decision invalidated a crucial part 
of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, which led to a power-sharing agreement 
among Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs in Bosnia”. One dissenter within the Court 
even condemned the judgment as “an exercise in star-struck mirage-build-
ing which neglects to factor in the rivers of blood that fertilized the Dayton 
Constitution.”65 On the other hand, in Ždanoka v. Latvia66, the ECtHR upheld 
a measure “that might be justifiable in Latvia that may scarcely be considered 
acceptable in the context of (another) political system, for example in a coun-
try which has an established framework of democratic institutions going back 
many decades or centuries.”67
Moreover, one could conclude that the passage of time since the change 
of regime is very relevant in overall jurisprudence in transitional justice cases: 
whereas in the immediate aftermath of a change of regime, broad and sweeping 
measures may be allowed, the more time elapses, the more individualized the 
assessment of interference with people rights should be. But, as pointed out by 
Varju68, there are exceptions to the rule: the attitude of the ECtHR did not ap-
pear to change when sufficient time had passed for new democracies to mature. 
Instead, the weight of the circumstance of transition in the balancing exercise 
was determined on the basis of the general circumstances of the interference 
with the fundamental right to property. Most importantly, one might also add 
here that in those cases, as the Velikovi judgment showed, the ECtHR’s analysis 
concentrated on “whether the interferences had clearly fallen within the scope 
of the legitimate aim of transition and whether the hardships suffered by the ap-
plicants has surpassed a certain ‘threshold of hardship’ that must be crossed in 
the condition of transition to find a breach of the right to property.”69 
63 Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, App. Nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06, ECtHR 
(Grand Chamber) (22 December 2009).
64 Brems, op. cit. in fn. 59. 
65 Here she refers to the dissenting opinion of judge Giovanni Bonello, para. 54. 
66 Ždanoka v. Latvia, App. No. 58278/00, ECtHR (GC), 16 March 2006.
67 Ibid., para. 133. 
68 Varju, op. cit. in fn. 61. 
69 Ibid. See Velikovi and Others v. Bulgaria, App. Nos. 43278/98, 45437/99, 48014/99, 
48380/99, 51362/99, 53367/99, 60036/00, 73465/01 and 194/02, ECtHR (15 
March 2007), para. 179. 
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Hence, the transitional measure can only gain the approval of the ECtHR 
when the general need to carry through social, political or economic transi-
tion entails a proportionate restriction of fundamental rights.70 In considering 
whether a transitional justice measure has infringed on the rights guaranteed 
by the Convention, the ECtHR will also, like in other cases, apply the three-
step test and scrutinize whether an interference with the rights in question was 
legal (accessible and foreseeable71), served a legitimate aim (whether the goal 
of the interference as brought forward by the state can be subsumed by one 
of the enumerated legitimate aims), and was necessary in democratic society 
(proportionality assessment).72 
Therefore, as Hamilton illuminates73, the passage of time is but one cru-
cial variable among others, including clarity of the impugned legislation, a 
state’s integration into regional or international organizations, the presence of 
alternative democratic safeguards such as Constitutional Court Review, con-
sociational protections, privacy guarantees, mechanisms of redress, or other 
reparative assurances.
Moreover, the ability of the ECtHR to recognize differences between tran-
sitions is hugely significant for scrutiny of the Croatian Act on Exemption. As 
Oomen has argued, transitional measures gain legitimacy from their “endoge-
neity: the extent to which they are rooted in local values of right and wrong, 
as well as local laws.”74
According to Sweeney, and based on his research of the ECtHR transitional 
jurisprudence, the first stage in any of the transitional cases that comes before 
the ECtHR is to ensure compliance with the formal rule of law. The second 
70 Compare with Brems, op. cit. in fn. 59, p. 289. 
71 E.g. see Adamsons v. Latvia, App. No. 3669/03, 24 June 2008, para. 116. 
72 See Silvenko v. Latvia, App. No. 48321/99, 9. October 2003, where there was found 
a legitimate aim to ensure the consolidation and maintenance of the newly 
formed democratic order, or Ždanoka (GC 2006) where securing the process and 
achievements of transition to democracy were characterized as necessary. In Jahn v. 
Germany (GC 2005) exceptional circumstances appeared that justified the lack of 
compensation in case of expropriation due to the switch from a state-controlled to 
a market economy. 
73 Hamilton, M., Transition, political loyalties and the order of state, in: Hamilton, Buyse 
(eds.), op. cit. in fn. 41, pp. 151 – 184, p. 181. 
74 Oomen, B., Transitional justice and its legitimacy: the case of local perspective, Netherlands 
Quarterly of Human Rights, vol. 25, no. 1, 2007, pp. 141 – 148. Also cited in 
Sweeny, op. cit. in fn. 43, p. 246. 
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stage is legitimacy: “it is vital not to give the impression that the only reason 
a measure is held to be “legitimate” is that it was imposed in the transitional 
context. Instead, the national transitional policy should be shown to corre-
spond clearly to the Convention’s legitimate aim, leaving the impact of the 
transitional context as a factor to be considered when assessing the means 
chosen to achieve the aim.” The third and most important stage is necessity:75 
“…whether a purportedly transitional measure is widely recognized as pursu-
ing a necessary task in the transitional process. If not, then there is no reason 
to treat it differently to any other rights-restrictive measure when it comes to 
the basis or width of the margin of appreciation.”76 A point of principle for 
transitional justice cases, as Sweeney underscores, can be extracted from the 
judgment in Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Metropolitan Inokentiy) 
and Others v. Bulgaria:77 “transitional societies’ common need to remedy unlaw-
ful acts of the past cannot, in a democratic society, justify disproportionate 
state action and further unlawful acts. Likewise, in relation to restitution, the 
Court has stressed that although such policies may be legitimate, states should 
ensure that they do not create “disproportionate new wrongs.”78 Therefore, 
the width of the margin in particular cases will be tied to some combination of 
various factors, including the right at stake, the way that it is invoked, and the 
legitimate aim the restriction pursues.”79 
That reasoning could be also seen in the case Velikovi and Others v. Bulgaria: 
“persons who have taken advantage of their privileged position or have other-
wise acted unlawfully to acquire property in a totalitarian regime80, as well as 
their heirs, cannot expect to keep their gain in a society governed democrati-
cally through the rule of law. The underlying public interest in such cases is 
to restore justice and respect for the rule of law.”81 Furthermore, the ECtHR 
in this case highlighted: “in a complex cases as the present one, which involve 
difficult questions in the conditions of transition from a totalitarian regime 
75 Also in Hamilton, Buyse, op. cit, in fn. 41, p. 29. 
76 Sweeney, op. cit, in fn. 43, p. 248.
77 Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Metropolitan Inokentiy) and Others v. 
Bulgaria, 22 January 2009 , Applications nos. 412/03 and 35677/04, para. 142.
78 Velikovi and others v. Bulgaria, op. cit. in fn. 69. 
79 Sweeny, op. cit. in fn. 44, p. 119. 
80 From the discussion on the punitive elements of the 1992 Bulgarian Law on the 
Restitution of Ownership of nationalized Real Property.
81 Cited also in Sweeney, op. cit. in fn. 43, p. 241. 
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to democracy and rule of law, a certain “threshold of hardship” must have 
been crossed for the Court to find a breach of the applicants’ Art 1 Protocol 
1 rights.”82 
In any circumstance, as Hamilton pointed out, in transitional justice cases, 
the ECtHR finds itself faced with cases burdened with a political, historical 
and factual complexity flowing from problems that should have been resolved 
by all parties assuming full responsibility for finding a solution on a political 
level. This reality, as well as the passage of time and the continuing evolution 
of the broader political dispute, must inform the ECtHR’s interpretation and 
application of the Convention which cannot, if it is to be coherent and mean-
ingful, be either static or blind to concrete factual circumstances.83
There is a particular category of cases that require implementation of the 
positive obligation of states to conduct investigations. As stated in the UN 
Publication on Transitional justice and economic, social and cultural rights84, 
it should be noted that the “respect, protect and fulfill framework applies 
equally to civil and political rights, which also entail both positive and nega-
tive obligations, for example, the positive obligation to conduct investigations 
into the circumstances surrounding enforced disappearances.”
Therefore, one could state that transition is recognized by the ECtHR as a 
valid consideration in determining the proportionality of a particular restric-
tion or the scope of the margin of appreciation, but it may not be the only or 
decisive factor. In some cases, as Marton Varju has highlighted, “the inappro-
priateness of the impugned measure is simply more relevant than the unique-
ness of the transition”.85 
82 Velikovi and Others v. Bulgaria, op. cit. in fn. 69, paras. 192 and 235, finding no 
violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1 on this basis.
83 Demopoulos and Other v. Turkey, 5 March 2010, Application nos. 46113/99, 
3843/02,13751/02, 13466/03, 10200/04, 14163/04, 19993/04, 21819/04 see para. 
87- 90. Also see Tanese v. Moldova (GC) 27 April 2010, Appl. No. 7/08., spec. para. 
159 and 174. Also see Republican Party of Russia v. Russia, Appl. No. 12976/07 12 April 
2011, at paras. 127-8. For more judgments see Hamilton, op.cit. in fn. 41, p. 180.
84 United Nations, United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 
Transitional Justice and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, United Nations 
Publication, 2014, p. 12. 
85 This especially refers to property cases. Varju, op. cit. in fn. 61. For instance, decision 
Oršuš v. Croatia, 16 March 2010, Appl. No. 15766/03 did not emphasize only the 
vulnerability of the Roma but also the consequent positive obligation of special 
protection.
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5. THE SANADER CASE AS THE NEW ECtHR TRANSITIONAL JU-
STICE CRIME CASE: WILL ECtHR HAVE A SAY? – VIOLATIONS 
OF RIGHTS OR CONFIRMATION OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
POLICY 
Since the internationally illegal acts for which the London Agreement established 
individual criminal responsibility were certainly also most objectionable in terms of mo-
rality, and the persons who committed these acts were certainly aware of their immoral 
character, the retroactivity of the law applied to them can hardly be considered as abso-
lutely incompatible with justice.
Justice required punishment for these men, in spite of the fact that under positive law 
the act they committed were not punishable at the time, but were made punishable with 
retroactive force. If two postulates of justice are in conflict with each other, the higher one 
prevails; and to punish those who were morally responsible for the international crime of 
the Second World War may certainly be considered as more important than to comply 
with the rather relative rule against ex post facto laws, open to so many exceptions.86
Since the judgment of Sanader is now final, one might expect Sanader to 
claim violations of his rights before the ECtHR. In any case, Sanader now has 
the possibility to claim that the Act on Exemption in retroactively abolishing 
the statute of limitations violated the human rights principles enshrined in the 
Convention and particularly that the Act on Exemption violates the principle 
of legality proscribed in Art. 7.
Therefore, in deciding Sanader case, the ECtHR could place emphasis on 
the circumstances of the Croatian transitional period, a possible violation of 
the principle of legality and the obligations of state when violations of eco-
nomic and social rights are concerned. Since the Act on Exemption is directly 
linked to the privatization period as well, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
relating to the protection of the economic well-being of the country could be 
addressed as well.87 Moreover, the ECtHR could go even deeper and recognize 
some forms of violation of economic, social and cultural rights recognized in 
the Act on Exemptions as crimes under international law, to which the statute 
of limitations is not applicable at all. 
Nonetheless, one of the most important questions related to abolishing the 
application of the statute of limitations for transitional economic crimes is 
86 Kelsen, H., Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent in International 
Law?, International Law Quarterly, vol. 1, 1947, pp. 153 – 165.
87 For more on jurisprudence related to economic well-being of the country see Rainey, 
B., Wicks, E., Ovey, C., The European Convention on Human Rights, 6th ed., Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 318 – 319. 
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whether such ex post facto laws are in conformity with the principle of legality. 
Moreover, the sensitivity of the matter is even more important when we ac-
knowledge the fact that these transitional economic crimes mainly took place 
during the ‘Homeland War’ and in the post-conflict period when the state 
was unable to effectively prosecute those crimes while violent crimes had a 
priority in addressing. Therefore, the ECtHR would potentially have to answer 
whether it was in accordance with the principle of legality to allow retroactive 
abolishment of the statute of limitations for the prosecution of economic of-
fences that occurred in the period of privatization and ownership transforma-
tion during, prior and immediately after the war, taking into consideration the 
particularities of the Croatian transitional period and values of the society. 
It is not plausible that the ECtHR will go so far as to find that violations 
of economic, social and cultural rights committed by Sanader represent crimes 
against humanity or war crimes, which are part of customary international law 
and for which there is no statute of limitations anyhow, but it will be interest-
ing to see the reasoning of the ECtHR in justifying or denying the retroactive 
effect of the Croatian Act on Exemption. Moreover, it should be noted that the 
interpretation and history of the second paragraph of Art. 7 of the Convention88 
is closely linked to transitional periods. This paragraph was created to, and in-
tended to89, legitimize post-Second World War transitional justice measures 
proscribing that the principle of legality (nullum crimen sine lege) must not preju-
dice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the 
time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles 
of law recognized by civilized nations.90 Therefore, although also unlikely, the 
ECtHR could find that Sanader’s behavior amounted to other war crimes that 
violate the right to property, which makes them statute barred but on the basis 
of non-applicability of the statute of limitations for crimes under international 
law, not on the basis on the Act on Exemption. One has to mention, though, 
that this possibility should not be excluded a priori for some other perpetrators 
to whom the Act on Exemption could be applied pro futuro. 
In any case, the ECtHR’s reasoning on the conformity of the retroactive 
application of criminal legislation with the principle of legality in transitional 
88 This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act 
or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to 
the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.
89 Brems, op. cit. in fn. 59, p. 300.
90 E.g. Schabas, op. cit. in fn. 83, p. 615. See jurisprudence of the court in cases: Kolk 
and Kislyiy v. Estonia (2006), Touvier v. France (1997), Jorgic v. Germany (2007), 
Kononov v. Latvia (GC 2010). 
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context91 is guided primarily with jurisprudence of transitional justice cases 
such as Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany.92 In this case the ECtHR con-
cluded that Art. 7 had not been violated because, contrary to the applicant’s 
claims, border killings did constitute an offence at the time they were com-
mitted, both under domestic law and under international law, even though 
domestic law was interpreted and applied in a different manner. Moreover, 
in the mentioned case, the ECtHR adopted the Radbruch’s Formula of ‘statu-
tory injustice’ (das gesetzliche Unrecht)93 following the reasoning of the German 
Constitutional Court.94 
Furthermore, in the landmark case of C.R. v. United Kingdom95 dealing with 
principle of legality, the ECtHR specified that Art. 7 “cannot be read as outlaw-
ing the gradual clarification of the rules of criminal liability through judicial 
interpretation from case to case, provided that the resultant development is 
consistent with the essence of the offence and could reasonably be foreseen”. 
As Schabas pointed out:96 in its application of Art. 7(1), the ECtHR has often 
seemed inspired by the same approach adopted by the International Military Tri-
bunal and endorsed by Kelsen (see quote at the beginning of this section).97 One 
result of this is its rejection of pure legal positivism, in favor of the ‘reasonably 
foreseeable’ and ‘accessible’ tests. The point was repeated by Shahabuddeen:98 
“as was indicated by the ECtHR in C.R. v the United Kingdom, the principle of 
91 Gallant, K. S., The Principle of Legality in International and Comparative Criminal Law, 
New York, Cambridge University Press, 2009.
92 Moreover, in this case, ECtHR ruled that it is a legitimate for a contracting state to 
convict people on the basis of the law in force at the material time interpreted in 
the light of the principles governing a state subject to the rule of law (Strelez, Kessler 
and Krenz v. Germany GC 2001, para. 81). Also see K-H.W. v. Germany GC 2001, 
Application no. 37201/97, para. 83). 
93 Radbruch, G., Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht, Süddeutsche 
Juristenzeitung, vol. 1, 1946, pp. 105 – 108. Translated by Paulson, B. L., Paulson, 
S. L, as “Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory law (1946), Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies, vol. 26, no.1, 2006.
94 For more details about the origin of this case see Roggemann, H., Systemunrecht und 
Strafrecht am Beispiel der Mauerschützen in der ehemaligen DDR, Berlin, Verlag Arno 
Spitz, 1993.
95 CR v. The United Kingdom, Series A, No.335-B, para. 41.
96 Schabas, op. cit. in fn. 62, pg. 615. 
97 Kelsen, op. cit. in fn. 86, p. 153, at 165. For an endorsement of Kelsen’s approach, 
see the reasons of Justice Peter Cory in R. v. Finta, (1994) 1 Supreme Court Reports 
701, at 874 (all cited in Schabas, op. cit. in fn. 62, p. 615).
98 Shahabuddeen, M., Does the Principle of Legality Stand in the Way of Progressive 
Development of Law?, Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 2, 2004, pp. 
1007 – 1017.
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nullum crimen sine lege does not bar development of the law through clarification 
or interpretation provided that the resultant development is consistent with the 
essence of the offence and could reasonably be foreseen.”99 So, it is the essence 
of the offence – or its ‘very essence’ – that governs. 
Thus, the ‘foreseeability’ of abolishing the statute of limitations for transi-
tional cases should also be addressed by the ECtHR in the Act on Exemption 
case in order to justify or deny the legality of retroactive implementation of the 
Act on Exemption. Moreover, in C.R. v. United Kingdom, the ECtHR100 “was 
persuaded in its opinion by the fact that the crime in question was offensive to 
‘human dignity and human freedom’.”101 
It must be underlined that Croatia proscribed retroactive application of the 
statute of limitations to already regulated offences, but only if certain conditions 
are met, e.g. if economic offences aimed at achieving disproportionate property 
gains by raising prices for goods in scarcity, by the sale of state-owned property 
far below its actual value, or otherwise taking advantage of wartime and a clear 
and present danger to the independence and territorial integrity of the state. 
Moreover, the most lenient punishment will be applicable to a particular offend-
er. Furthermore, this “extension” of the statute of limitations could be also said 
to follow Art. 29 of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption102, which 
calls on states to provide for the suspension of the statute of limitations where 
the alleged offender has evaded the administration of justice and establish longer 
statutes of limitations for offences under the Convention.103 As stated above, 
Croatia enacted this law to combat transitional economic crimes. This narrative 
might justify the interpretation of Art. 7(2) of the Convention in the manner 
articulated by Schabas. It was only after the State Audit Report was published104 
that Croatia began to seriously address transitional economic crimes and one 
could hardly state that it was not foreseeable that Croatia would try to find solu-
tions to start to effectively prosecute privatization and ownership transformation 
crimes that occurred during the Homeland war and peaceful integration. 
99 Ibid., para. 34.
100 Schabas, op. cit. in fn. 62, p. 615.
101 See also Streletz, Kessler and Krentz v. Germany, op. cit. in fn. 46, paras. 85 – 87; 
Kononov v. Latvia, op. cit. in fn. 23, p. 236.
102 UN(2000): General Assembly Resolution 55/61. Convention Against Corruption. UN 
Document no. A/RES/55/61.
103 Ibid.
104 Croatia: State Audit Office Report on Revision of Ownership Transformation and Privatisation 
(2004) (in Croatian only). Available online: http://www.revizija.hr/izvjesca/2007/
revizije-pretvorbe-i-privatizacije/000-izvjesce_o_radu.pdf (last visited on 11.11.2014).
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Hence, one could notice that judgments by the ECtHR interpreting nulla 
poena sine lege concerning the retroactive banning of statute of limitation for 
the offences which became already statute barred are scarce. The infrequency 
of challenges itself “suggests the entrenchment of the maxim in municipal law 
and practice, as do the types of challenges among the few that have come be-
fore the European Court.”105 A similar conclusion can be drawn from the Venice 
Commission opinion given in the Comments on the Retroactivity of Statutes of Limi-
tations in Georgia.106 The Opinion concludes that the case law of the ECtHR 
establishes that it is permissible to amend a limitation law so as to extend the 
limitation period with retroactive effect with regard to crimes where the limita-
tion period has not expired at the time of the amendment, if the domestic law 
of the state regards a limitation law as procedural rather than substantive.107 
Although the ECtHR has not decided yet whether a retroactive extension is 
permissible in the case of crimes where the prescription period has already run 
out, the following paragraph from the judgment in Coëme and others v Belgium108 
could give some insight in possible future ECtHR’s reasoning: “The Court 
notes that the applicants, who could not have been unaware that the conduct 
they were accused of might make them liable to prosecution, were convicted 
of offences in respect of which prosecution never became subject to limitation. 
The acts concerned constituted criminal offences at the time when they were 
committed and the penalties imposed were not heavier than those applicable 
at the material time. Nor did the applicants suffer ... greater detriment than 
they would have faced at the time when the offences were committed...”109
On the other hand, it is undisputed and clear that “criminal procedures 
against government ministers have to respect Art. 6 of the ECtHR on the right 
to a fair trial, including the minimum rights set out in Art. 6 (3) for persons 
charged with a criminal offence. The same goes for the principle of ‘no punish-
ment without law’ in Art. 7. These rules apply regardless of whether the per-
son accused is an ordinary citizen or a government minister, and regardless of 
105 Dana, S., Beyond Retroactivityto Realizing Justice: A Theory on the Principle of Legality in 
International Criminal Law Sentencing, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, vol. 
99, 2008-2009, pp. 857 – 928, p. 871.
106 Opinion No. 523/2009, CDL(2009) 048, 4 March 2009.
107 As it was stated in the Opinion (2009), p. 2 (based on the scholarship of Kok, R. 
A., Statutory Limitations in International Law, the Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2007, 
especially Chapter VII, Imprescriptibility and Retroactivity).
108 Coëme and others v, Belgium Judgment of 18 October 2000, Applications Nos 
32492/96, 32547/96 and 32548/96. 
109 Ibid., para. 106. 
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whether the minister is charged before the ordinary criminal courts or before a 
special court of impeachment.” It must be mentioned that in such high-profile 
trials dealing with transitional economic crimes, one of the most important 
issues is ensuring fair trials.110 For instance, in Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Rus-
sia111, the ECtHR found, inter alia, a violation of Art. 6 of the Convention on 
account of the breach of lawyer-client confidentiality and unfair taking and ex-
amination of evidence by the trial court. If the right to a fair trial in those high-
profile cases is infringed, substantive justice might be impossible to achieve.
Therefore, the case of former the Prime Minister of Ukraine, Yulia Ty-
moshenko112, could also be relevant for the ECtHR if the Sanader case were to 
appear on its agenda. She was sentenced in 2011 to seven years in prison for 
‘misuse of powers’ concerning the gas deal and got a three-year prohibition on 
exercising public functions. The judgment became final in November 2012. In 
the Tymoshenko case the ECtHR found violations of Article 5113 and 18114 of 
the Convention. 
110 In the Sanader case, the Constitutional Court already had a chance to decide upon 
his procedural rights (see Constitutional Court Decision, U-III-5141/2011, from 
December 6, 2011. The Constitutional Court in this Decision ruled that the reasons 
indicated in the courts’ decisions (from 17th and 25th of October 2008) on the 
prolongation of the investigative detention of Mr. Sanader are no longer relevant 
and sufficient to justify his continuing detention according to criteria established by 
ECtHR and accepted by the Croatian Constitutional Court itself. In this ruling, the 
Constitutional Court cited many relevant ECtHR’s decisions regarding protection 
of human rights guaranteed in art. 5 of the Convention, including decisions of 
Khodorkovskiy v. Russia (Application No. 5829/04, 31 May 2011, paras. 182-187), 
Wemhoff v. Germany (App. No.  2122/64, 27 June 1968, § 15), Neumeister v. Austria 
(App. No. 1936/63, 27 June 1968, §14), Tomasi v. France (App. No. 12850/87, 27 
August 1992, § 98),  Bernobić v. Croatia (Appl. No., 57180/09,  21 June 2011, § 60), 
Kauczor v. Poland (App. No. 45219/06, 3 May 2009, § 46), Kudła v. Poland (App. No. 
30210/96, GC, 26 October 2000, § 111), Stögmüller v. Austria (App. No. 1602/62, 
10 November 1969, § 15). In the para 19.2 of the Decision, the Constitutional 
court, based on the ECtHR’s reasoning, emphasized the following: “The persistence 
of reasonable suspicion that the person arrested has committed an offence is condicio 
sine qua non for the lawfulness of the continued detention, but after a certain lapse 
of time it no longer suffices. The Court must then establish whether the other 
grounds given by the judicial authorities continued to justify the deprivation of 
liberty. Where such grounds were ‘relevant’ and ‘sufficient’, the Court must also be 
satisfied that the national authorities displayed ‘special diligence’ in the conduct of 
the proceedings.”
111 Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia. Application nos. 11082/06 and 13772/05, 25 
October 2013.
112 Tymoshenko v. Ukraine. Application no. 49872/11, 30 July 2013.
113 Referring to the right of liberty and security.
114 Limitation on the use of restrictions on rights. 
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6. CONCLUSION: IMPORTANCE OF THE ACT ON EXEMPTION 
FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE NARRATIVES
In any circumstance, transitional cases present a double legal legacy: (1) 
they are read into domestic judicial reasoning and thereby inform and shape 
political and legal agendas at the national level, and (2) they can fundamen-
tally strengthen the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.115 That is precisely what 
could happen with the Act on Exemption if the ECtHR were to have a chance 
to decide on the Act and its validity. The Court will have a chance to respond 
whether retroactive application of the Act on Exemption was in accordance 
with the rule of law and transitional justice policy and with the principle of 
legality.116 Furthermore, and this makes this case somewhat unique, the EC-
tHR could by its ruling also show how it perceives the necessity to protect 
economic, social and cultural rights when violations of those rights were com-
mitted in a transitional period. Moreover, the ECtHR could with this case 
make a landmark ruling on the importance of protecting economic, social and 
cultural rights in general and as to whether it follows new discourses regarding 
protection of those rights that are visible in international human rights law 
and in the transitional justice narratives.
As Teitel stated117, in regional case law, and in transitional jurisprudence, 
the conception of law is partial, contextual and situated between at least two 
legal and political orders. Legal norms are necessarily multiple (legal plural-
ism), while the idea of justice is always a compromise. As Sharp illuminated, 
the field of transitional justice distinguished itself in its attempt to balance 
twin normative aims: the demands of justice and accountability on the one 
hand, and the assumed needs of a political transition on the other.118 Thus, 
formative debates in the field focused on the possible dilemmas and trade-offs 
associated with justice in times of political transition, including the so-called 
115 Hamilton, Buyse, op. cit. in fn. 41, pp. 20 – 21.
116 See for more about the principle of legality: Gallant, K. S., The principle of Legality in 
International and Comparative Criminal Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2009. 
117 Teitel, R. G., How are the New Democracies of the Southern Cone Dealing with the Legacy 
of past Human Rights Abuses?, in: Kritz, N. J. (ed.), Transitional Justice: How Emerging 
Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, Vol. I, Washington, D.C., United States 
Institute of Peace, 1995, pp. 146 – 154.
118 Paige, A., How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional 
Justice, Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 31, no. 2, 2009, p. 326, cited in Sharp, D. N., 
op. cit. in fn. 25, 2014, p. 7. 
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peace versus justice debate.119 However, as stated above, the Act on Exemption 
has its particularities and could add more to the mentioned debate by under-
lying the importance of addressing economic crimes in transition in order to 
achieve both justice and positive peace. 
In any case, protection of economic, social and cultural rights through a con-
firmation by the ECtHR that retroactive application of Act on Exemption is 
in accordance with Art 7 of the Convention, as long as criminal offences on 
account of any act or omission did constitute a criminal offence under national 
or international law at the time when they were committed, should be received 
with acclamation if the ECtHR adopts that line of reasoning. That would defi-
nitely also be possible if in some transitional war profiteering cases connection 
could be established with, for example, Art. 8 (2) (b) (ix) of the Rome Statute120 
or with crimes against humanity, especially with persecution described in the 
Art. 7 (1) (h)121 of the Rome Statute. Since the Act on Exemption refers to war 
conflict, this could be one of the plausible solutions, but it is questionable if it 
could be applied in the Sanader case. In any case, this kind of ruling of the Court 
could contribute to the development of international criminal law as well. 
On the other hand, it is questionable whether the introduction of new le-
gal instruments, like those adopted in Croatia more than 20 years after the 
privatization had started, or more than 10 years after the Homeland war and 
peaceful integration had ended, could be considered an adequate and effec-
tive approach to combat transitional economic crimes and confiscate illegally 
obtained assets. Especially it would be problematic to obtain evidence in order 
to achieve convictions according to fair trial rights respecting all the rights 
of indicted persons.122 Moreover, there is always the danger of selective and 
119 In the United Nations Secretary General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in 
Post-conflict Societies, UN Doc. S/2004/616 (August 23, 2004), 1 it is argued that 
“[j]ustice, peace and democracy are not mutually exclusive objectives, but rather 
mutually reinforcing imperatives.” Emphasized by Sharp, D. N., op. cit. in fn. 7.
120 For violations of economic, social and cultural rights see particularly Schmid, E., 
PhD study, Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International and 
Transnational Criminal Law, soon to be published by Cambridge University Press. 
For salient examples see also United Nations (2014), United Nations Human 
Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Transitional Justice and Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, United Nations Publication, 2012, pp. 32 – 38.
121 Prosecutor v. Kupreškic et al., No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Chamber, Judgement of 14 
January, 2000. See in particular paras. 610 – 613, 615 (c), 618, 621 and 630 – 631.
122 That is why the importance of the Constitutional Court Decision in the Sanader 
case should not be underestimated, especially since the Court ruled out and 
prevented possible violations of art. 5 of ECtHR in this case, see supra fn. 111.
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non-systematic prosecutions, which could reflect badly on the “transitional” 
law that had the intention to invoke the principle of “social justice”. This is, 
however, possibly not the question of legality of the Act itself, but its practical 
implication in the Croatian society. 
Therefore, in the scrutiny of the Act on Exemption, one could further ask 
whether Realpolitik or Restoration of Justice and Return of Moral Principles would 
win when one is addressing this transitional justice mechanism. One could 
reach a preliminary conclusion that both could win, at least in the ‘clear cut’ 
situations where the Act on Exemption will certainly be applicable to cases for 
which the statute of limitations had not yet expired at the moment of its entry 
into force. In cases where it had already expired, a more progressive “transi-
tional justice” approach by ECtHR could be taken by allowing retroactivity in 
those cases as well.123 Especially since the Act on Exemption did not create or 
retroactively criminalize new criminal offences. 
In any case, if this “Croatian model” of transitional justice laws is proven 
to be effective and legally justified, primarily by the Croatian Constitutional 
Court itself124 and/or the ECtHR, it could be implemented in the other coun-
tries in the region and possibly serve as a model on how to approach long ne-
glected crimes – transitional economic offences that have grave consequences 
on the development of the society itself.125 
123 Cf. Novoselec, Roksandić Vidlička, Maršavelski, op. cit. in fn. 4. 
124 For more about this topic and possible outcomes of using the statute of limitations 
in order to achieve social goals taking into account the Croatian situation and 
the rule of law see also Amicus curi@e, Nezastarijevanje – Adversus hostem aeterna 
auctoritas, Informator, No. 6143, 19. January 2013, pp. 1 - 7. Roksandić Vidlička, 
op. cit. in fn. 2; Munivrana Vajda, M., Roksandić Vidlička, S., Novije promjene u 
uređenju zastare u Republici Hrvatskoj – na tragu političke instrumentalizacije ili težnje 
ka ostvarenju pravednosti?, Žurnal za kriminalistiku i pravo, vol. XVIII, 2013, pp. 
243 – 260; Drenški Lasan, V., Odnos načela vladavine prava i instituta obvezne primjene 
blažeg zakona s aspekta zastare u praksi hrvatskih sudova, Odvjetnik, no. 9–10, 2010, pp. 
41 – 45; Novoselec, P., Novosel, D., Nezastarijevanje kaznenih djela ratnog profiterstva 
i kaznenih djela iz procesa pretvorbe i privatizacije, Hrvatski ljetopis za kazneno pravo 
i praksu, vol. 18, no. 2, 2011, pp. 603 – 620, Novoselec, Roksandić Vidlička, 
Maršavelski, op. cit. in fn. 4. 
125 See also Roksandić Vidlička, op. cit. in fn. 11, p. 27.
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Sažetak
    Sunčana Roksandić Vidlička*126*
MOGUĆI BUDUĆI IZAZOVI ZA EUROPSKI SUD ZA 
LJUDSKA PRAVA?
VAŽNOST ZAKONA O NEZASTARIJEVANJU I PREDMETA 
SANADER ZA JURISPRUDENCIJU EUROPSKOG SUDA ZA 
LJUDSKA PRAVA I RAZVOJ MEHANIZAMA TRANZICIJSKE   
       PRAVDE**127**
Izmjene i dopune hrvatskoga Ustava 2010. godine, kojima je dopušteno retroaktivno 
procesuiranje gospodarskih kaznenih djela vezanih uz proces pretvorbe i privatizacije 
počinjenih za vrijeme Domovinskog rata i mirne reintegracije te kaznenih djela rat-
nog profiterstva (tranzicijska gospodarska kaznena djela), otvorile su Pandorinu kutiju. 
Ustavne su izmjene omogućile i donošenje Zakona o nezastarijevanju kaznenih djela 
ratnog profiterstva i kaznenih djela iz procesa pretvorbe i privatizacije. Valja tvrditi 
kako te izmjene Ustava i navedeni Zakon pripadaju mehanizmima “tranzicijske pravde” 
postkonfliktnog društva te da su doneseni sa svrhom ostvarenja pune vladavine prava i 
ostvarenja načela socijalne pravde u hrvatskom društvu. Slučaj koji je procesuiran na 
temelju toga Zakona, a nedavno je pravomoćno riješen, odnosi se na postupak protiv 
bivšeg predsjednika Vlade Republike Hrvatske Ive Sanadera. 
U ovome se članku obrađuje sam pojam tranzicijske pravde te se razmatra potreba 
zaštite ekonomskih, socijalnih i kulturnih prava u okviru mehanizama kojima se tran-
zicijska pravda služi. Navedena se problematika obrađuje u članku radi analiziranja 
mogućeg pristupa Europskog suda za ljudska prava prema takvim hrvatskim “tranzicij-
skim” slučajevima na temelju postojeće jurisprudencije Suda. Naime, može se očekivati 
kako će se sam Zakon o nezastarijevanju, kao i predmet Sanader, naći u skoroj buduć-
nosti pred Europskim sudom za ljudska prava kako bi opravdao ili opovrgnuo legalitet 
samog donošenja. Ako se to dogodi, rezoniranje Suda u tom predmetu bit će od velike 
važnosti ne samo za Republiku Hrvatsku, nego i za sve države koje nisu u dovoljnoj 
mjeri procesuirale tranzicijska gospodarska kaznena djela te su ih općenito zanemarila 
prilikom implementiranja mehanizama karakterističnih za tranzicijska društva. Jednako 
tako, predmet nakon završetka pred Sudom može utjecati i na razvoj mehanizama tran-
*  Mr. sc. Sunčana Roksandić Vidlička, asistentica Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u 
Zagrebu, Trg maršala Tita 14, Zagreb 
**  Članak je napisan u okviru istraživačkog projekta Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u 
Zagrebu.
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zicijske pravde općenito. Stoga ovaj članak nastoji predvidjeti neka od pitanja kojima 
bi se Europski sud za ljudska prava mogao baviti prilikom pravne analize Zakona o 
nezastarijevanju, počevši od načela zakonitosti.
Ključne riječi: tranzicijska pravda, predmet Sanader, jurisprudencija Europskog 
suda za ljudska prava u tranzicijskim predmetima, Zakon o nezastarijevanju kaznenih 
djela ratnog profiterstva i kaznenih djela iz procesa pretvorbe i privatizacije, moguće 
rezoniranje Suda u pogledu Zakona o nezastarijevanju 

